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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
and doctor bills from the fund, -and defendant denied the application. The statute pro-
vides: "Whenever any member of the police'department . is confined to any hospital
or to his home. . . the board shall pay the necessary hospital, care and nursing ex-
penses ...." Held: the defendant acted illegally in ruling that the benefits to which
plaintiff was entitled were limited as a matter of law to those provided under the
contract between the defendant and the Jocal hospital.
Municipal Departments and Officers-Examination and Promotion. Stoor v. City of
Seattle, 44 Wn2d 405, 267 P2d 902 (1954), was an action to annul an oral examination
given to plaintiffs by the civil service commission. The city charter required written
competitive examination except where tests of manual or professional skill are neces-
sary. Defendant contended the oral examination was necessary to and did test the
professional skill of plaintiffs. The majority of the court ruled a captaincy in the fire
department is a profession and thus the city charter permits oral testing. As a problem'
of first instance, the majority decided competitive tests need not be strictly objective as
long as all candidates take the same tests and are in competition with one another.
Following the prevailing practice in problems of this sort, the court allowed the civil
service commission wide discretion in the examination and promotion of candidates.
Schools and School Districts--Teachers' Reappointment. In State ex rel. Welch v.
Seattle School Dirtrict No. 1, 145 Wash. Dec. 6, 272 P2d 617 (1954), the school
district sent relator a registered letter advising her that her existing contract to teach
would not be renewed. The letter was never delivered. Relator demanded issuance of
her contract under RCW 28.67.070. Upon refusal, she appealed to the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction who ruled she was entitled to the contract. Relator in
this action secured a writ of mandate to compel reinstatement. Held: the contract was
conclusively presumed to have been renewed pursuant to RCW 28.67.010. The school
district could have appealed the State Superintendents decision, but since no appeal
was taken, "the decision became final under the purview of RCW.28.88.040."
Zoning. State ex rel Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 145 Wash. Dec. 460, 275 P.2d 899
(1954). Relator made a formal application to the city for a permit to construct business
buildings on a part of his land zoned for business. Defendant denied the application,
asserting relator had made no provision for off street parking as provided by city
ordinance. Relator leased a tract of land which complied with all the standards of the
ordinance applicable to parking facilities, and made reapplication for a building permit.
Defendant asserted the leased tract was not being put to its best use and denied the
permit in the exercise of its administrative discretion, whereupon relator sought a writ
of mandat6 to compel issuance of the permit. Held: a building permit must issue as a
matter of right upon full compliance with the applicable ordinance. The court said the
only discretion which is permissible in zoning matters is that exercised in adopting the
zoning classifications which must be of general applicability. The administration of a
zoning ordinance can only be concerned with questions of compliance with the standards
of the ordinance and not with the wisdom of the policy set forth in the ordinance.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Judgment N.O.V.-Inconsistent Testimony by the Same Witness
May Be Considered. In Halder v. Department of Labor and Indus-
tries,' the court qualified the- rule that a judgment notwithstanding
' 44 Wn2d 537, 268 P.2d 1020 (1954).
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the verdict cannot be granted unless it can be said as a matter of law
that there is neither evidence, nor reasonable inference from evidence
to sustain the verdict.2 The court said that if "indispensable testimony
is, in effect, retracted or completely negatived as a result of inconsist-
encies and contradictions in the other testimony of the same witness,
that fact is to be considered in passing upon the motion."'
A judgment n.o.v. cannot be resorted to where there is any element
of discretion involved. If there is an element of discretion, the remedy
is by a motion for a new trial." Furthermore, the court cannot weigh
the evidence in considering a motion for a judgment n.o.v.5 In Wallig
v. Elbert,' the court said that if the trial court found the witness's testi-
mony so conflicting as to make it unworthy of belief, the judge may
grant a new trial after the verdict, but he can not grant a judgment
n.o.v. without invading the province of the jury. Yet, it appears that
the qualification stated in the Halder case does allow the court to
exercise a limited discretion and to weigh the evidence to the extent
indicated above in passing on a motion for a judgment n.o.v.
The effect of such qualification would be to limit the general prop-
osition that, even though a party's evidence is in some respects un-
favorable to him, he is not bound by the unfavorable part when the
court passes on a motion for a judgment n.o.v.7 The Washington court
was apparently taking the sensible position that the rule excluding
contradictory evidence from consideration in passing on a motion for
a judgment n.o.v. does not mean, where a witness contradicts himself
on a material point, the court must consider only the part of his testi-
mony on that point which favors the party for whom he testifies."
Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 3-Noting Action for
Trial or Hearing. In reversing a dismissal of an action for want of
prosecution, the court, in Friese v. Adams,9 held that Rule of Pleading,
Practice and Procedure 310 does not require a case to be tried within one
year from the date that issues are joined, nor does it require that the
action be set for trial when the year ends. The rule requires only that,
2 Rettinger v. Bresnahan, 42 Wn2d 631, 257 P2d 633 (1953).
3 After stating the qualification, the court held that the asserted inconsistencies did
not amount to a negation or retraction of the witness's testimony. As the rule was
found inapplicable to the facts, it might be regarded as dictum.
4 Mattson v. Griffin Transfer Co., 90 Wash. 1, 155 Pac. 392 (1916).
5 Chess v. Reynolds, 189 Wash. 547, 66 P.2d 297 (1937).
6 87 Wash. 489, 151 Pac. 1081 (1915).
7 Moen v. Chesnut, 9 Wn2d 93, 113 P2d 1030 (1941).
8 Fitch v. Thompson, 322 Ill. App. 703, 54 N.E.2d 623 (1944).
9 44 Wn.2d 305, 267 P.2d 107 (1954).
10 34A Wn.2d 69.
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within one year after issues are joined, the moving party must "note
the action for trial or hearing" in order to avoid dismissal for want of
prosecution.
The court clarified the method of noting an action, by stating that
it consists of giving to the opposing party the statutory notice provided
for by RCW 4.44.020. This statute provides that at least three days
before setting day the moving party must serve the statutory notice
upon the opposite party and file the notice with the county clerk. When
this is completed, the running of the one year period-is tolled.
This holding has the effect of nullifying some rather loose language
by the court concerning Rule 3. In State ex rel. Lyle v. Superior Court,",
it was said that the duty of granting a motion for dismissal without
prejudice for want of prosecution "is imposed by the express manda-
tory conditions of the rule which provides for dismissal of action if not
brought to trial or hearing within one year . ... " It is probable that
such confusion is the result of that portion of Rule 3 which declares
that an action not noted in time will not be dismissed if "the failure to
bring the same on for trial or hearing was caused by the party who
makes the motion to dismiss." It is apparent that to "bring the same on
for trial or hearing" is not synonymous with "note the action for trial
or hearing." The Friese case clearly indicates the latter is the only re-
quirement to avoid dismissal for want of prosecution under Rule 3.
Granting a Continuance of Trial When Party Absent-Effect of
Stipulating Absent Party Will Testify as Alleged. In Chamberlin
v. Chamberlin,2 a divorce proceeding by the husband, the defendant's
motion for a continuance because of the wife's illness and inability to
travel to the place of trial was denied. This denial was held to be an
abuse of the trial court's discretion. The plaintiff-husband urged that
the court had authority to deny the continuance under RCW 4.44.040.
This statute provides, in part, that in a motion to continue a trial
because of absence of certain evidence, "if the adverse party admits
that such evidence would be given, and that it be considered as actually
given on the trial . . ., the trial shall not be continued." The plaintiff
complied with the statutory requisites, yet the court held that, notwith-
standing the statutory language, a motion for a continuance is always
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; such a stipulation
113 Wn.2d 702, 102 P2d 246 (1940).
1244Wn2d 689, 270 P2d 464 (1954).
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by the plaintiff does not relieve the court from exercising its discretion
in passing on the motion.
The court said that it has never held that the statute compels a trial
court to deny a continuance where the opposing party stipulates that
the absent party, if present, would testify to certain facts. However
the court has never held that the quoted portion of RCW 4.44.040 was
not mandatory, as the language "shall not be continued" seems to
declare.
Prior to the Chamberlin case, the court inferentially indicated that
the denial of a continuance by the trial court where the adverse party
agrees that the absent witness will testify as alleged, might, under un-
usual circumstances, be considered an abuse of discretion," but it had
never expressly so held. This holding clearly indicates that the trial
court does not have an absolute authority to deny a continuance upon
compliance with the statutory requirements. The grant or denial of a
continuance is always a discretionary matter and open to abuse of dis-
cretion. The above portion of RCW 4.44.040 is to be used merely as a
guide to what is sound discretion for a specified situation, to be followed
unless circumstances appear that call for a converse ruling.
The court rejected the rule stated in Thorntkwaite v. Greater Seattle
Realty and Improvement Co. 4 In the Thornthwaite case the court
held that a stronger case for a continuance must be made if the absent
witness is a party to the action than if he were a third person; it is the
duty of a party to be present at his trial, and such party's absence
will generally be considered at his own peril. In the instant case the
court felt such statement was in conflict with other Washington deci-
sions, but the court did not expressly repudiate the statement. The
court limited the application of the Tkornthwaite rule to cases where
the party has, without sufficient cause, absented himself from the place
of trial." The rule is not to be extended to cases where the party has
absented himself with sufficient cause, as when the party's absence is
caused by a bona fide illness.
The court, in the Chamberlin case, committed itself to the general
rule that whether the trial court was within the proper use of its dis-
cretion in ruling on a motion for a continuance is dependent upon the
is Traynor v. White, 44 Wash. 560, 87 Pac. 823 (1906).
14 160 Wash.651, 295 Pac. 933 (1931).
15 The court limits the same statement in Nye v. Manley, 69 Wash. 631, 125 Pac.
1009 (1912), from which the Thornthwaite rule is taken, though it is somewhat quali-
fied in the Nye case. This restriction is also upon a similar rule stated in Donaldson v.
Green, 40 Wn.2d 238, 242 P.2d 1038 (1952).
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circumstances of each case, the test being whether the grant or denial
of such motion operates in the furtherance of justice." The court has
recognized, as a factor for consideration, that rarely can a case be tried
in the absence of a party to the action."7 A voluntary absence by a
party to an action would undoubtedly be a circumstance warranting a
denial of a motion for a continuance under the general rule. In view of
these considerations, it is submitted that the broad Tkornthwaite rule
has been rendered a nullity by the effect of the court's severe limitation
upon it.
A Party May Use His Own Deposition-No Right to Examine Ad-
verse Party at Trial Who Resides Outside Prescribed Area. In Air-
craft Radio Industries, Inc. v. Palmer, Inc., 11 a Connecticut corpora-
tion brought an action for the purchase price of electronic equipment.
The plaintiff corporation took the deposition of its manager in Con-
necticut to be used at the trial. The defendant filed no cross-interrog-
atories when notified that the deposition was to be taken. The defend-
ant contended that it was error to admit the deposition and to proceed
with the trial without the manager, as the defendant was deprived of
his right to examine the adverse party at the trial guaranteed by Rule
of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 42."
The court said that whether or not the trial court erred. in refusing
to suppress the deposition is answered by Rule of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure 26,"9 not Rule 42 as contended. Rule 26 is broad enough
to permit a party to take his own deposition, to be used as evidence. at
the trial, if any of certain enumerated conditions are present." The
applicable condition, making the deposition admissible in this case, is
Rule 26(d) (3)2, which authorizes its use if the court finds: "that the
witness resides out of the county and more than 20 miles from the
place of trial, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was
procured by the party offering the deposition .... "
As the manager (for purposes of this action the court assumes that
the manager's deposition is the deposition of the corporation) resides
1617 C.J.S. 194 (1952), Continuances, 36; See Strom v. Toklas, 78 Wash. 223, 138
Pac. 880 (1914), and Zulauf v. Carton, 30 Wn2d 425, 192 P2d 328 (1948).
17 Strom v. Tokias, supra note 16.
18 145 Wash. Dec. 686, 277 P2d 737 (1954).
10 34A Wn2d 106.
2034A Wn2d 84.23 Rule 26 (a) provides in part that "the testimony of any person, whether a party
or not, may be taken at the instance of any party by deposition," and in Rule 26 (d)
(3) "the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any pdrty
.... " See 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAclcE 1195, 1196 (2d ed. 1950).
1955]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
in Connecticut, the only question is whether the corporation could be
said to have procured its own absence. The court held that the term
"absence" in the "unless" clause refers to absence from the county and
more than 20 miles from the place of trial, and not absence from the
trial.22 Therefore, it cannot be said that one who resides out of a terri-
tory embraced within a radius of 20 miles from the place of trial has
procured his own absence from such area. 3 This is probably so even
if the party's absence is due merely to a preference to use his deposi-
tion rather than to testify orally at the trial.2" The court indicates that
the "unless" clause refers only to a situation where a party instigates a
witness (including the party himself) to go outside the prescribed
area.
5
The defendant's primary contention is that the trial court erred when
it refused to strike the plaintiff's pleadings and enter judgment for the
defendant, as dictated by Rule 42 when a party refuses to attend and
testify at the trial. The defendant relies on the first sentence of Rule
42: "A party to an action or proceeding shall not be precluded from
examining the adverse party as a witness at the trial." It was argued
that Rule 42 limits Rule 26, so that one can only take the deposition of
an adverse party, and not his own deposition (for a party need not
discover from himself).
The court said the above language suggests the inquiry of "precluded
by what?" This sentence was taken from RCW 5.04.040,28 which de-
clared that a party, having filed interrogatories to be answered by the
adverse party, shall not be precluded from examining the adverse party
at the trial. The court stated that the transfer of this language into
Rule 42, in abbreviated form, did not create a new situation; Rules 42
and 26 were promulgated at the same time, they are of equal force, and
one must be interpreted so as not to invalidate the other. In effect, the
court is holding that Rule 42 is not to be read literally, but as if it were
the filing of interrogatories that does not preclude examination at the
trial.
Rule 42 was amended (effective January 3, 1955) to eliminate the
issue raised by the Aircraft Radio Industries case. The controverted
22 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1196 (2d ed. 1950).
23 Weis v. Weiner, 10 F.R.D. 387 (1950), decided on Rule 26 (d) (3) 2, FED. R.
Crv. P., which varies only in "that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States. . .
24 4 MooRE's FEDERAL P.ACTICE 1196 (2d ed. 1950).25 Weis v. Weiner, supra note 23; 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1196 (2d ed. 1950).
26 Abrogated by RULE OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PR0CEDURE 44, 145 Wash. Dec.
No. 9 (1954 Amend.).
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first sentence of the rule previous to the amendment is replaced with
language even more explicit than that of RCW 5.04.040:
A party who has filed interrogatories to be answered by the adverse party
or parties shall not be precluded for tlat reason from examining such
adverse party or parties as a witness at the trial.1
7
It is now clear that Rule 42 does not guarantee a right to examine the
adverse party, regardless of where he resides, at the trial.
STAXLEY M. SAMUELs
Appellate Practice-Violations of Rules on Appeal. The importance
of strict adherence to the Rules on AppeaF cannot be expounded too
often, nor can the more common mistakes be pointed out too frequently,
so that some unsuspecting and perhaps careless counsel may avoid
having an appeal dismissed for noncompliance with the rules.2" Appeals,
in whole or in part, have continued to be dismissed in 1954 for failure
to comply with requirements set forth in the Rules on Appeal. 0 While
perhaps some of these dismissals might be excused because of an am-
biguity or misunderstanding, the majority of them could very easily
have been averted had appellate counsel taken the trouble to investigate
and adhere to the applicable requirements.
Changes in Rules on Appeal. Ruie 16. Power's of Supreme Court.
The last sentence of this rule81 is reworded to read as follows: "Without
27145 Wash. Dec. No. 23 (1955 Amend.).
2s 34A Wn2d 3 et seq.
29 See Editor's Notes, 28 WAsH. L. REv. No. 1 (1953); Note, Appellate Brief
Assignments of Error-Changes in the Rules, 29 WASH. L. Ray. 150 (1954).
30 Where there was no assignment of error directed to the findings of fact entered
by the trial court they were conclusively presumed to be the facts of the case under
Riz ow APPEAL 43, 34A Wn2d (1953 Amend.). State ex rel. Welch v. Seattle School
District, 145 Wash. Dec. 6, 272 P2d 617 (1954). In .Union Electric and Plumbing
Supply Inc. v. United Ass'n, ets., 145 Wash. Dec. 15, 272 P2d 144 (1954), the findings
of facts made by the trial court were regarded as the established facts of the case where
these facts were not set forth verbatim in the defendant's brief on appeal as required
in Ruiz ON APPEAL 43, 34A Wn2d (1953 Amend.) cf., Vandermeer v. Belk, 145
Wash. Dec. 379, 275 P2d 436 (1954). In State v. Hartwig, 145 Wash. Dec. 69, 273 P2d
482 (1954), the court would not discuss any assignment of error which was not sup-
ported by argument as required in RULE ON APPEAL 42, 34A Wn2d (1953 Amend.). A
fifty-six page supplemental statement of facts was stricken where it was not filed within
the ninety-ddy period prescribed by RuLE ON APPEAL 34, 34A Wn2d 36. Donald W
Lyle, Inc. v. Heidner and Company, 145 Wash. Dec. 753, 278 P2d 650 (1954). In
O'Brien v. Schultz, 145 Wash. Dec. 717, 278 P.2d 322 (1954), a cross appeal was dis-
missed for three reasons, each justifying a dismissal: (1) cross appellants filed no
notice of cross-appeal as required by Ru.E oN APPEAL 33 (3), 34A Wn.2d 33; (2) thejudgment or order appealed from was not in the record of the court [See State ex rel.
Thomas v. Lawler, 23 Wn.2d 87, 159 P.2d 622 (1945)] ; and (3) cross-appellants' brief
contained no assignments of error as required by RuL ON APPEAL 43, 34A Wn2d(1953 Amend.).
31 RuLE ON APPEAL 16, 34A Wn.2d 23.
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the necessity of taking a cross-appeal the respondent may present and
urge in the supreme court any claimed errors by the trial court in in-
structions given or refused and other rulings which, if repeated upon a
new trial, would constitute error prejudicial to respondent."" The only
changes are the adding of the phrase "Without the necessity of taking
a cross-appeal," and the adding of the words "given or refused" after
the word "instructions." Apparently these changes are to further clarify
the requirements of the Supreme Court under Rule 16 regarding the
presentment and urging of any claimed errors by the respondent.
Rule 44. Transcript on Appeal. A new subdivision designated as (4)
was added as an amendment to Rule 44.3 This provides that at the
time the transcript is completed and certified the appellant shall mail
to each of the prevailing parties in the trial court, or his counsel, a copy
of the clerk's index to the transcript.3 "
Rule 57. Other Original Writs. An additional paragraph was added
at the end of Rule 57.3" This amendment makes it necessary for the
relator to file a two hundred dollar bond, or two hundred dollars cash
in lieu thereof, with the clerk of the supreme court at the time of filing
his certiorari petition. This is conditioned that the relator will pay all
costs assessed against him in the certiorari proceedings, or in the dis-
missal thereof, not to exceed two hundred dollars.2
Rule 58. Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition. Subdivision (5) of
Rule 58". has been changed so as to exclude certiorari, as provided for
in Rule 57, from the requirement of making the relator, if a private
party, deposit twenty-six dollars with the clerk of the supreme court, 8
since this amount was raised to two hundred dollars by the amendment
to Rule 57.
Rule 65. Abrogation of RCW 4.88.180. The addition of Rule 6511
makes no real changes in the Rules on Appeal. Its effect is to eliminate
RCW 4.88.180 and all other court rules relating to the subject matter
of Rules 1740 and 4341 of Rules on Appeal, and Rule 1142 of Rules of
32 RULE ON APPEAL 16, 34A Wn.2d (1954 Amend.).
33 RULE ON APPEAL 44, 34A Wn.2d 47.
34 RULE ON APPEAL 44, 34A Wn.2d (1954 Amend.).
35 RULE ON APPEAL 57, 34A Wn.2d (1953 Amend.).
36 RULE ON APPEAL 57, 34A Wn,2d (1953 Amend.).
37 RULE ON APPEAL 58, 34A Wn.2d 63.
38 RULE ON APPEAL 58, 34A Wn.2d (1954 Amend.).
.3 RULE ON APPEAL 65, 34A Wn.2d (1954 Amend.).
40 RULE ON APPEAL 17, 34A Wn.2d 24.
41 RULE ON APPEAL 43, 34A Wn.2d (1953 Amend.).
42 RULE OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 11, 34A Wn.2d 75.
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Pleading, Practice and Procedure. Rule 17 sets out what may be re-
viewed and the new rule does away with identical wording in the
statute. Rule 43 gives the requirements for setting out the assignments
of error in the appellant brief. The effect of this section of Rule 65 does
not change the present procedure. However, the significance of this
section of the new rule is apparent. A number of appeals were dismissed
in 1954 for failure to comply with the requirements for setting out the
assignments of error in the appellant brief. These requirements are
very dearly set out in Rule 43 and these dismissals were due to care-
lessness of counsel rather than any ambiguity in the rules. The adop-
tion of Rule 65 eliminates any possible misinterpretation by an attorney
reading the abrogated statute or any court rules relating to this subject
matter. This should further drive home the fact that Rule 43 must be
strictly adhered to. Rule 11 of Rules of Pleading, Practice and Pro-
cedure makes exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law
unnecessary to obtain appellate review of causes tried without a jury.
A conflicting rule set out in RCW 4.88.180 is taken off the books by
the abrogation of that statute and though it was of no effect a possible
ambiguity was eliminated. The overall effect of Rule 65 is to further
clarify the rules by eliminating possible misinterpretations due to the
abrogated statute or other rules relating to this subject matter.
WMLTAm G. VMRT
Default Judgment-Appearance Is Not a Pleading Required to Be Filed to
Avoid Default. In Tiffin v. Hendricks, 44 Wn2d 837, 271 P.2d 683 (1954), the court
reversed a default judgment where neither notice nor a copy of the motion was first
served upon the defendant. The defendant served written notice of his appearance in
the action on the plaintiff's attorney, but it was not filed with the clerk of the court
previous to the entry of the default judgment. Since written notice of appearance served
on the plaintiff need not be filed in order to constitute an appearance, the defendant had
appeared in the action before the plaintiff moved for an order of default. Consequently
the court had no authority to grant the motion in the absence of service of a three-day
notice to the defendants required by Superior Court Rule 3, 34A Wn2d 110, and also
the service of the motion for default upon him required by Superior Court Rule 4, 34A
Wn.2d 111. As the court had no authority to enter the default judgment, it had no dis-
cretion to exercise as to the matter, and the defendant was entitled to have the default
judgment set aside as a matter of right without alleging or proving a meritorious de-
fense. The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to bring this case within Superior Coitrt
Rule 1 (2), 34A Wn2d 110, which provides that pleadings must be filed on or before
the time fixed by-the notice of the adverse party for the hearing of any motion or de-
murrer addressed thereto, and that the party whose pleading is not filed within such
time may be adjudged in default. It is significant that the court, for the first time, clearly
defined the "pleadings" which Rule 1 (2) requires to be filed to avoid a default. They
are defined as: "written allegations of claims or defenses to which an opposing party
1955]
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may address some motion, demurrer or denial." Consequently notice of appearance
cannot be a pleading within Rule 1 (2) as it asserts no claim or defense.
Amendment to the General Rules of the Superior Courts.-Rule 16-New Trial.
Superior Court Rule 16, 34A Wn.2d 131, was amended to delete the "denying" part of
the paragraph following subdivision 9. [144 Wash. Dec. No. 23 (effective July 1,
1954).] As the rule now stands, the trial court must give definite reasons of law and
fact when it grants a motion for a new trial. If the court denies a motion for a new
trial, there is no longer the requirement of stating its reasons in the denying order. The
desirability of deleting the "denying" part was pointed out in 29 WASH. L. Rv. 145-147
(1954).
Amendment to the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure-Rule 44-Abroga-
tion of Certain Statutes. A new rule was adopted to the Rules of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure. Rule 44, 145 Wash. Dec. No. 9 (effective September 1, 1954). Rules of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure 26 through 37, 34A Wn.2d 84 et seq., adopting the
federal rules governing discovery, involved a major change from the statutory discovery
procedures. Notwithstanding RCW 2.04.200, which declares all laws in conflict with
rules of court are of no further effect, there has been some confusion by continuing to
apply the statutory discovery procedures. See 29 WASH. L. REv. 143 (1954). Rule 44
clarifies precisely which sections of RCW are rendered ineffective by the discovery
procedures in Rules 26 through 37.
PROPERTY
Real Property - Easements - Easement by Implied Reservation.
Adams v. Cullen' established for the first time the validity in Washing-
ton of easements by implied reservation. A driveway had been con-
structed to serve both a residence adjacent to the street and the
residence behind. Both residences were upon the same tract of land,
held by a single owner. The driveway had been used for both resi-
dences for many years. The quasi-servient tenement, adjacent to the
street, was conveyed to the defendant prior to the plaintiff's acquisition
of the rear property. Construction of another driveway for the plain-
tiff's premises would have entailed grading a 45 foot incline to the
street below, a project of considerable expense. Plaintiff was held to
possess an easement by implied reservation in the driveway across the
defendant's land.
Following previous decisions on implied easements,2 the court re-
stated the three requirements: unity of title and subsequent separa-
tion; an apparent and continuous quasi-easement during unity of title;
and a certain degree of necessity. The court then pointed out that
"Unity of title and subsequent separation is an absolute requirement.
144 Wn.2d 502, 268 P.2d 451 (1954).2 Bailey v. Hennessey, 112 Wash. 45, 191 Pac. 863 (1920) ; Wreggit v. Porterfield,
36 Wn.2d 638, 219 P.2d 589 (1950) ; Silver v. Strohm, 39 Wn.2d 1, 234 P.2d 481 (1951).
[MAY
